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THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

Part I

ORGANIZATION, LEADERSHIP, STRENGTH, AND PROGRAM

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OIR Report No. 4162.1

August 1, 1946

R&A #4162.1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of Research for Near East and Africa
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FOREWORD

This study was drafted in mid-1946 by a member of the staff of the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, who had been stationed in India during the latter part of World War II and the period immediately following. Although the study describes the Muslim League prior to partition and the creation of the Dominion of Pakistan, the draft has been found by officers of the Department to be useful for an understanding of the present situation in Pakistan. It is therefore being reproduced for general dissemination. It has not been possible to bring the study up to date.

Part II of this project, subtitled Leading Members, has already been disseminated. It contains biographical sketches of outstanding members of the Muslim League and lists of Muslim League members of the Constituent Assembly (1946) and of the legislatures in provinces with Muslim majorities.

July 13, 1948

SUMMARY

The strength and cohesion of the All-India Muslim League derives from a highly unified national organization dominated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President since 1934. Under Jinnah, the most important organ is the Working Committee, selected from members of the central Council by Jinnah himself. The Working Committee is composed for the most part of men of relatively meager abilities and attainments who are incapable of challenging Jinnah's autocratic control. A number of younger men occupy prominent positions in the League's organization but they have neither the capacity nor the inclination to register dissent to the rulings of the "high command," whom they hold in awe.

In a situation where a lack of conformity to Jinnah's wishes means immediate loss of position in the League, effective opposition within the Muslim community has developed only in preponderantly Muslim centers where rival leaders can gain substantial followings of their own and where the necessity of Muslim unity to avoid submergence by Hindus is not clearly apparent. Whereas the League enjoys the backing of about three-fourths of the Muslim voters throughout India, this support is, interestingly enough, much stronger in those provinces where the Muslim proportion of the population is lowest.

In only two provinces, Sind and Bengal, was the League able to form the government following the provincial elections in early 1946, and then only with the support of small European groups in the legislatures. The League nevertheless has achieved to a large extent its objective of being recognized as the dominant if not the sole representative of the Muslim community in India, and it is the only political organization beside the Congress Party which occupies an important place in India's political picture. If Jinnah can establish the principle that no Muslim can attain office except as a representative of the League, he could force out of the Congress Party all Muslim members interested in politics or in government service as a career.

The Muslim League is now organized in every province in British India. Each provincial league has its own Working Committee, Council, and Parliamentary Board on much the same plan as the national organization. Provincial Councils elect members to the central Council and are themselves composed of members elected by district and local units of the League. The ostensibly democratic character of the organization is in reality a facade, as all provincial officers and all League nominees for public office are screened by parliamentary boards representing the views of the "high command"; there is no appeal from the boards' decisions.

The League is essentially a conservative organization, its leadership being composed largely of landowners and lawyers who give no promise of sponsoring any liberal reforms for the betterment of the lot of the peasants and workers. British friends of the League are largely Conservative Party members. The allegedly socialist aspects of Islam are frequently cited as proof of the liberal character of the League, but such

social principles as can be found in the Koran have not been translated into a program for immediate action. The appeal of the League is basically communal and culminates in the demand for Pakistan, a separate sovereign state in which the culture of the Muslims will flourish and their interest predominate. The propaganda program has been kept on an emotional level, and there is obvious reluctance to define specifically the concept of Pakistan. The League has become a fighting organization which demands unity and loyalty of its followers. Jinnah is prepared to deny the status of true Muslims to all co-religionists who refuse to accept his discipline.

Recent developments appear to have influenced the League to abandon its traditional dependence on constitutional methods for achieving its ends. Having failed to accomplish its objective by negotiation and having seemingly lost the support of the British Government, it threatens now to resort to direct action. Some observers doubt that Jinnah and his conservative following are really capable of carrying out a policy of revolutionary violence. The only organization of a military character connected with the League, the Muslim National Guards, is an undercover organization whose capabilities are unknown.

The Communist Party gives qualified and somewhat unwelcome support to the Muslim League, presumably because Communists encountered difficulty in infiltrating the Congress Party. The relations between the League and the Indian princes are friendly.

INTRODUCTION

The All-India Muslim League, which now [1946] ranks as the second most powerful political party in India, was founded in 1906 by a group of conservative influential Muslims led by the Aga Khan.[1] Its purpose was the promotion of Muslim interests in the light of anticipated political reforms for which the new nationalist movement of India was striving. This organization was thoroughly loyal to the British Government, merely asking for governmental positions for the group it represented. Most of the progressive Muslim group, however, neglected the League because of its communal and conservative attitudes.[2]

After a few years the leadership of the League passed into the hands of men of more progressive and nationalist views, and the League began to hold its annual sessions alongside those of the Congress Party. A measure of cooperation between the two movements was achieved, as represented in the Lucknow Pact of 1916 in which the League agreed to join in the demand for independence and the Congress Party agreed to separate electorates and proportional representation for the Muslims in the central and provincial legislatures of a self-governing India. The League during the years following World War I made little progress. It carried on negotiations with the Congress Party from time to time and never adopted a strong anti-Congress attitude. In the meantime the most important Muslims, such men as Mohammed and Shaukat Ali and many of the present leaders of the Muslim League, such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Khaliq-uz-zaman, and Mohammad Ismail Khan, became leaders in the Congress. Many Muslims belonged to both organizations.

It was only after the adoption of the Government of India Act of 1935 and the elections of 1937 that the Muslim League began to make a popular appeal to Muslims on a strongly communal basis. In the succeeding years the League under Jinnah's leadership became essentially a new organization, so much so that many of its members describe it as only ten years old. It has taken its place as chief adversary of the Congress and claims to express the views and aspirations of all the Muslims of India.

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1. The history of the Muslim League is available in many books and is therefore merely summarized in this report. The following references are suggested: Indian Year Book, article on Muslim League; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, (Lahore, 1943); Reginald Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India (Oxford University Press, 1944); M. H. Saiyid, Mohammad Ali Jinnah A Political Study (Lahore, Ashraf, 1945); Humayun Kabir, Muslim Politics (Calcutta, Modern Art Press, 1943); Mohamed Noman, Muslim India (Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1942).

2. Smith, op.cit., p. 284.

I. ORGANIZATION

Theoretically the Muslim League is a democratic institution with power residing initially in the membership at large and exercised through a pyramid of organizations - the local and district bodies, the provincial Leagues, and the national organization, with the President at the peak. However in actual practice the League has been dominated and controlled by Jinnah since 1934. Hiw views and decisions are ratified by one or another of the national bodies and communicated downward to the subsidiary organizations in the provinces.

A. National

Jinnah has created various bodies within the national organization to carry out specific functions as the need arises. It is difficult, therefore, to distinguish clearly their respective spheres of responsibility.

The Council is constitutionally the most powerful body in the national organization. It elects the President of the All-India Muslim League, ratifies the actions of the Working Committee, drafts resolutions for the consideration of the Session, and affiliates and disaffiliates the provincial leagues. It is also responsible for executing the decisions of the Session.

Meeting at least twice a year, the Council is composed of about 500 members, most of whom are selected by the provincial leagues. Provincial representation is on a quota basis; the Bengal, Punjab, and United Provinces select slightly over half (260) of the total membership. The national officers of the Muslim League and the League's elected representatives in the Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of State (both Indian Governmental bodies) are members of the Council ex officio.

The Working Committee, with a membership of twenty-one selected annually by Jinnah from the Council, acts as the President's cabinet and meets at his call, normally five times a year. It is the executive authority of the League between meetings of the Council and the Session and executes the decisions of those bodies. It prepares the annual budget and authorizes expenditures. The Working Committee appoints the members and exercises general control over the activities of the Central Parliamentary Board and the provincial parliamentary boards. The Committee also recommends to the Council the disaffiliation of provincial League organizations.

The Committee of Action, consisting of six members chosen by Jinnah, was established by the Session in December 1946. Operating as a sub-committee of the Working Committee, the new group was charged with promoting the expansion of the League, directing publicity, and related functions.

The Session is a large body with a membership of some 2,000, including the members of the Council and representatives of each of the provincial leagues to the number of three times its Council quota. The Session meets very infrequently. Its primary function is to act on proposed revisions of the League's constitution.

The Central Parliamentary Board of three members supervises the selection of Muslim League candidates for the Central Legislative Assembly. The Board also passes on the lists of approved candidates for provincial legislatures drawn up by the several provincial parliamentary boards and recommends changes. It is the link between the Muslim League's national organization and the League's representatives in the central and provincial legislatures and is responsible for coordinating the activities of the legislators with Muslim League policy.

B. Provincial

Most of the provincial organizations are composed of a council, a working committee, and a provincial parliamentary board. A few also have committees of action, but these are not provided for in their constitutions.

The highest authority in the provincial League is the council, consisting of representatives of district and city leagues, Muslim League members of the provincial legislative assembly and council of ministers, and women members. The councils are relatively large bodies; that in Bengal has five hundred members and in the United Provinces about four hundred. Each council elects its own officers, working committee, and representatives to the central Council. Provincial parliamentary boards nominate candidates for provincial elections, subject to the control of the Central Parliamentary Board.

C. District and Local

Any Muslim resident of British India who is eighteen years old or over may join a primary League by subscribing to the rules and objectives of the Muslim League and paying two annas annual dues. Primary Leagues vary in size from fifty to five hundred members as determined by the provincial league. Each primary League elects a representative to a sub-divisional League, whose territory is usually co-extensive with the basic administrative unit of the province. Each sub-divisional league in turn elects a representative to the council of the district League, and the district councils send representatives to the council of the provincial League. In urban areas, the primary Leagues are organized by wards and elect representatives to the city Leagues, which in turn are represented on the provincial councils.

D. Muslim National Guards

The Muslim National Guards are the para-military organization of the Muslim League. First organized in 1936, they underwent reorganization in 1944 and came under the control of the Working Committee. The commander or salar is appointed by the Working Committee, to which he submits quarterly reports. The functions of the Guards are stated to be: "To train and discipline Muslims in coordinate activity for social and physical uplift of the Muslims and to maintain peace, tranquillity, and order in the country, and foster among Muslims the spirit of sacrifice for the nation, country, and humanity."

In a private conversation, Nawab Siddique Ali Khan, the present salar, stated that although the Guards were restricted in their activities during the war by government prohibitions on

marching, wearing private uniforms, etc., the strength of the organization had greatly increased. Little is known of the Guards' actual strength or activities, except that contingents are in evidence at public meetings of the Muslim League.

II. LEADERSHIP[1]

A. Central Organization

1. President. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a distinguished lawyer and politician from Bombay, has been President of the Muslim League continuously since 1934. Jinnah was long associated with both the Muslim League and the Congress Party, but it was only after the elections of 1937 that he cast his lot irrevocably and uncompromisingly with the League and began to develop it into a formidable political party with himself as virtual dictator. Major questions of League policy and program are decided by Jinnah. Although they are sometimes inconsistent and unpredictable, they are accepted unhesitatingly.

Jinnah is a peculiarly aloof and unapproachable person and his life has been very lonely. He is a widower, his wife having committed suicide; he is estranged from his only daughter; his sole companion is his sister. His political colleagues are followers, not friends; their attitude toward him is one of respect and subservience. He has the capacity to attract young men to his cause and to them he is the leader -- "the fuehrer," as some of them say -- and they do not question his leadership.

Jinnah's legal training appears to govern his approach to all questions, and most of his acquaintances consider him incapable of leading a revolution or of successfully using unconstitutional means. He is nevertheless a shrewd and calculating politician and has proved his political acumen on numerous occasions. He has no flare for dramatization to rival that of Gandhi, but he has a tremendous capacity to weigh issues and bide his time. Although he is a very ambitious man, he is recognized as absolutely honest and above purchasing. He has achieved his position by ability and single-mindedness.

Jinnah's career is part and parcel of the Muslim League; if the League disappears, his kingdom collapses. Some Indian observers feel that he might unconsciously prefer to postpone the achievement of India's independence so that his own important position might be maintained. However, the creation of a separate Muslim state as a result of his efforts would give him added prestige and assure him of a place in history. He believes that a sovereign Pakistan is the only solution for the allegedly grievous ills of the Muslim community, and as Jinnah has seldom been known to admit the possibility of being in error, it will probably be very difficult for him to recede from this position.

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1. The evaluations of personalities in this chapter are based on public statements made by the individuals under discussion, newspaper accounts of political activities in which they have been engaged, conversations with personal acquaintances both inside and outside the League, and the personal observations of the writer.

At the same time the initial League acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's proposals for a Constituent Assembly did suggest Jinnah's willingness to accept something less than complete partition, even though it may have been only a political maneuver of transitory significance.

Although Jinnah is the leader of the Muslim community, he is himself not a religious man. His opponents, especially among Nationalist Muslims, frequently point this out and in contrast recall the eminence of Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress leader, as a Muslim divine. In this respect, however, Jinnah is typical of the political leaders of the Muslim League in general, almost none of whom observe Muslim religious rites. Jinnah's grandfather was a Hindu converted to Islam. He is a Khoja, a member of a branch of the followers of the Aga Khan. The Muslims have recently given Jinnah the title of Qaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), doubtless inspired by the title of Mahatma (Saint) by which Gandhi is universally known.[1]

Jinnah has usually been friendly with the British. It is significant that many conservative British officials in India support Pakistan, and all the British members of the Viceroy's Cabinet and Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of Sind, are believed to have spoken to the Cabinet Mission in favor of it. Jinnah's British friends are said to belong in the main to the Conservative Party and it is possible that the accession to power of the Labour Party made necessary the modification of this Anglophile policy. However, the friendship which is known to exist between Sir Stafford Cripps and Jawaharlal Nehru may affect Jinnah's response to the proposals of the Labour Government. In the past it has been to his advantage to play a waiting game since the Muslim League has usually had nothing to lose by postponement of a settlement. To some extent Jinnah forsook this line in the Cabinet Mission negotiations. Although he dragged out the discussions considerably, in the end the League accepted the Cabinet Mission's award before the Congress did. Jinnah is generally regarded as unyielding, but he is actually a skilled and close bargainer. A member of the Cabinet Mission staff stated that Jinnah demonstrated, late in the negotiations, a realization of his responsibility and an unwillingness to plunge the country into chaos.

In addition to being President of the League, Jinnah is a representative of Bombay and leader of the Muslim League Party in the Central Legislative Assembly.

2. Secretary. The honorary secretary of the All-India Muslim League and the deputy leader of the Muslim League Party in the Central Assembly is Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, a moderately wealthy landowner of the United Provinces. He is not outstanding either in ability or personality; it is reported that he obtained only third class honors at Aligarh University and secured a degree at Oxford under special war regulations. He has attained a place of importance through hard work, and many believe he will

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1. Although Muslim League members attempted to gain widespread acceptance of this title, the government-controlled All-India Radio refused to employ it.

be Jinnah's successor. In his position as secretary, which he has held since 1937, his contacts with Jinnah are probably closer than are those of any other official of the League. In public and private statements he maintains a strict party line and always defers to Jinnah's opinions and decisions. Nevertheless, many observers believe that Liaquat Ali is actually a moderate and might at any appropriate time break away from the League as a leader of a moderate group. It is said that he has attempted to persuade Jinnah to withdraw from extreme positions, as for example at the Simla Conference in July 1945. He is a cogent defender of the Muslim League position, but sometimes seems careless of historical facts in the process, perhaps on the assumption that political necessity knows no limitations.[1]

The present Begum Liaquat Ali[2] is a political asset to her husband (and to the Muslim League, too, in view of Jinnah's austere and unsocial life), since she is an accomplished hostess and makes their home in New Delhi the League's social headquarters as well as the meeting place of the Working Committee. At her functions she brings Muslim League leaders together with government officials, British and Indian, and diplomatic representatives. Liaquat Ali, himself is lacking in warmth and social charm, so that it is difficult to imagine him winning the affection of his followers.

3. Working Committee. Jinnah effectively dominates the operations of the Working Committee. The meetings are secret and the security of the members is good. Fairly reliable information indicates that issues are not settled by vote. Jinnah asks for opinions and then summarizes the "sense of the meeting" in terms of his own views; this becomes the decision of the Committee by consent.

As Jinnah selects only his close followers to sit on the Committee the members seldom voice any disagreement with him and are on the whole a weak lot.[3] Yusuf Haroon, a prominent member

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1. For example, Liaquat Ali denied having made an agreement with Desai, the Congress Party Leader in the Indian Assembly, for reorganization of the Viceroy's Council, although Desai had in his possession a copy of the agreement initialled by Liaquat Ali.
See OIR-4162.2, The All-India Muslim League, Part II, Leading Members, August 1, 1946, CONFIDENTIAL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY, p. 6, for biographical sketch of Liaquat Ali.

2. Some criticism has been levelled against Liaqunt Ali for abandoning his first wife to her village life. The present Begum is of Hindu ancestry but was reared as a Christian. She has now become an aggressive Muslim.

3. Beside Jinnah and Liaquat Ali, the Committee included as of May 1946 the following: Nawab Mohammed Ismail Khan (U.P.), Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman (U.P.), Begum Mohammed Ali (Delhi), Syed Abdul Raoof Shah (C.P.), Abdul Matin Chaudhury (Assam), Sardar Aurangzeb Khan (N.W.F.P.), Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (N.W.F.P.), Ismail Chundrigar (Bombay), Qazi Mohanmed Isa (Baluchistan), Haji Abdus Sattar Essak Sait (Madras), Mauland Mohammed Akram Khan (Bengal), Hasan Ispahani (Bengal), Raja of Mahmudabad, treasurer (U.P.), Nawab Iftikhar Hussain of Mamdot (Punjab), Latiful Rehman (Bihar), Khan Bahadur Khukro (Sind), Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin (Bengal), and Hussain Iman (Bihar).

of the Muslim League has expressed the following opinion:

> Many people on the Committee are not good; they are there because Mr. Jinnah must choose as his cabinet men who think as he does. Those on the Committee who will occasionally express an opinion at variance with Mr. Jinnah's are Nawab Ismail Khan, Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Mr. Khukro, and Sir Nazimuddin. The Raja of Mahmudabad also sometimes differs with Mr. Jinnah but out of deference to the leader will not voice his differences.

Yusuf Haroon confessed that, although he himself never presumed to differ with Jinnah, he was convinced that it was a mistake for Jinnah to surround himself by sycophants and never to hear contrary views expressed.

Several examples of Jinnah's dictatorial tactics can be cited. A. R. Siddiqi in a description of his first experience as a member of the Working Committee in 1937 reported that Jinnah, in the chair, read the first resolution on the agenda. Siddiqi asked a question to open discussion, but others immediately moved that the matter be left to the discretion of the chair. This was repeated three times, after which Siddiqi moved that the rest of the agenda be left to the discretion of the chair. He was not reappointed to the Committee the next year.[1] G. M. Syed, a former member of the Working Committee, stated that members who wished to oppose Jinnah's views but were afraid to do so often asked Syed to take the lead, promising to support him. "But," Syed said, "they always funked it." Anyone who expressed a difference of opinion became a marked man.[2]

Jinnah tells the Committee only what he wants it to know. During the Cabinet Mission negotiations, although the Working Committee was in session in New Delhi and later in Simla, the members were not apprised of the developments of the talks nor of the position taken by Jinnah. The Committee, and later the Session, gave Jinnah complete authority to act on behalf of the Muslim League. However, the final acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's proposals was made by the Council, which had been called for the purpose.

Syed also stated that at a meeting of the Working Committee in Lahore prior to the famous Gandhi-Jinnah talks, Jinnah informed the members that he had received an invitation from Gandhi to meet for discussions, and asked their opinion. When the Working Committee advised Jinnah to accept the invitation, he stated that he had already done so. He then said he proposed to issue a statement of policy on the following day. Syed asked Jinnah if the Working Committee might have the honor of seeing the statement. Jinnah replied in the negative.

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1. However, the "high command" recognized the necessity of securing men of high caliber for the Central Legislative Assembly and supported Siddiqi's candidacy. He is considered one of the ablest members of the Assembly, but continues to be a thorn in the side of the Muslim League Party, which is unable to control him.
2. However Syed himself remained a member of the Working Committee for five years.

After the meeting Syed tried to get some member in favor with Jinnah to ask him for the statement. Liaquat Ali refused, saying "Why should I displease him?" Nazimuddin agreed to try, but Jinnah declined.

Jinnah's attitude is undoubtedly due in part to the vast difference between his ability and that of the other members of the Committee. Although the Muslim League formally expressed offense at a statement of an American journalist that Jinnah had no second, or even eighth,[1] the truth of the appraisal can scarcely be denied.[2] Jinnah may also justify his failure to consult the Committee on the grounds that the political situation is often delicate and the Muslim League must be represented by one man enunciating an integrated program. It is interesting to note that such opposition to Jinnah's views as is expressed comes from his older associates, not from the youthful members of the Committee.

Most Indian political leaders have been at some time associated with the Indian National Congress, and the older members of the Working Committee of the Muslim League are no exception.[3]

About half of the members of the Working Committee are large landholders and other half are lawyers. Two members have interests in trade. In general, the Committee represents considerable wealth, mostly landed, and is conservative in economic outlook. Nevertheless, many of these individuals claim to be socialists in the light of Islamic teachings. In any case, up to the present the Muslim League has been concerned chiefly with communal issues, and has not felt the necessity of formulating a social and economic program. One of its wealthiest members, M.A.H. Ispahani,[4] in an address before the Bengal Muslim Chamber of Commerce of which he is president, advocated a mild form of socialization of industry. Others in private conversations have spoken favorably of land reform. But, on the whole, the Committee is an economically conservative if not reactionary group. When it was suggested to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, founder of the Khudai Khitmatgar organization ("Red Shirts"), in the North-West Frontier Province, that the Muslim League expected to make Pakistan a socialist state according to the teachings of the Koran, he asked cynically, "Are they going to become good Muslims overnight?"[5]

The Working Committee of the Muslim League, in contrast

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1. Robert Sherrod in Time, April 22, 1946.
2. A member of the staff of the Cabinet Mission expressed the view that Jinnah seemed to be the only "heavyweight" in the Muslim League, but that there were strong Muslims outside the League.
3. Among former members of the Congress are: Jinnah, Ismail Khan, Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Abdul Raoof Shah, Abdul Matin Choudhury, Hossain Imam, Nishtar, and Begum Mohammed Ali. This former relationship has left a heritage of antagonisms which is a handicap in most Congress-League negotiations.
4. See OIR-4162.2, p.4, for biographical sketch.
5. Interview with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

to that of the Congress,[1] has a fair share of young men. Qazi Isa and Mahmudabad are only about thirty years old; Mandot and Ispahani are under forty-five; and six others are about fifty.

4. Committee of Action. As of May 1945, the Committee of Action consisted of Nawab Mohammed Ismail Khan, chairman; Liaquat Ali Khan, convener; Qazi Muhammed Isa, the Nawab of Mandot, and Haji Abdus Sattar Essak Sait. G. M. Syed was a member until his expulsion from the League in December 1945.

The members have travelled all over India carrying on organization work for the League. The task of reorganizing the League in North-West Frontier Province, where it is weakest, was assigned to Isa, and prior to the provincial elections he spent more than six months in this work.

Nawab Ismail Khan has been active for many years in United Provinces politics, where he is president of the Provincial Muslim League. He is now a member of the Central Legislative Assembly. He presides at the meetings of the Working Committee in Jinnah's absence, and some believe there is rivalry between him and Liaquat Ali to become Jinnah's successor. Ismail Khan is moderate in his views. He does not like the Hindu way of life but believes the adherents of two different religions and cultures can live peaceably side by side. A Muslim colleague has expressed the view that Ismail Khan would welcome a settlement with the Congress even at the cost of modifying the demand for Pakistan. He was willing to come to some kind of compromise on the constitutional issue. A well-informed observer of United Provinces politics states that Ismail Khan is intelligent and of strong moral character.[2]

Qazi Muhammed Isa is a young barrister from Quetta who never practised law, but has taken up politics and gives his entire time to the Muslim League. He is looked upon as a favorite of Jinnah, whom he never criticizes and privately calls "the fuehrer". It is a common opinion that Isa is a man of very limited ability and could scarcely be considered as Jinnah's successor. However, he is a very facile speaker on all subjects, has a mind well-supplied with facts and arguments, and is an indefatigable worker. He has charge of publicity for the League, an activity only recently developed, and under his guidance the League is distributing a fair amount of propaganda. One of his colleagues has expressed the view that Isa could never have an important place because he does not adhere to the moral standard demanded of political leaders.

The Nawab of Mamdot is leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party in the Punjab and would have been prime minister of the province if the League could have formed a government. He is the largest landholder of the Punjab. His chief strength seems to

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1. As of May 1946, there were only two or three members of the Congress Working Committee under sixty years of age.

2. This paragraph is based on interviews with Ismail Khan, R. U. Singh, Yusuf Haroon, and others. See OIR-4162.2, p. 4, for biographical sketch.

3. Interviews with Isa, Durga Das of the Hindustan Times, Yusuf Haroon, and others. See OIR-4162.2, p. 4, for biographical sketch.

lie in the fact that he is not self-seeking and gets on well with all factions, an asset not likely to be underestimated by the "high command." But he is not an able man. He is shy and unaccustomed to public speaking. A colleague expressed the opinion that Mamdot would never think Jinnah wrong on any question and that because he is a "yes-man" and gave the League a hundred thousand rupees, Jinnah insisted upon his being leader in the Punjab.[1]

Essak Sait, vice president of the Madras Provincial League, has been given the position of whip in the Muslim League Assembly Party, and is generally considered to be a loyal Jinnah man.[2]

B. League Members in the Indian Legislature

1. Central Legislative Assembly. All the members of the Central Legislative Assembly elected in 1945 to represent Muslim constituencies are members of the Muslim League.[3] Only two other elected members are Muslims.[4] With the exception of Jinnah and Abdur Rahman Siddiqi, both of whom are effective speakers, the caliber of these representatives is not considered high. However, as the Congress and Government members are equally weak, the Muslim League does not make a bad showing by comparison.[5] Jinnah is considered by some the ablest member of the Assembly, but he attends very irregularly.

Siddiqi, formerly a member of the Bengal Legislative Assembly, was elected to the Central Assembly in 1945 on the Muslim League ticket, although he is a rebel Leaguer and unfriendly to Jinnah. He has influence in the Assembly as an individual, but none in the Muslim League. He seems to enjoy publicizing his unorthodox position and has a caustic tongue.

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1. Interviews with Mamdot, Taj-ud-din of the Associated Press in Lahore, Mrs. Satifi, Yusuf Haroon, and others. See OIR-4162.2, p. 6, for biographical sketch.

2. Interviews with Essak Sait and Yusuf Haroon. See OIR-4162.2, p. 2, for biographical sketch.

3. Haji Abdus Sattar Haji Essak Sait (Madras); M. A. Jinnah (Bombay); Nawab Mohammed Ismail Khan (U.P.); Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan (U.P.); Raja Mohammed Amir Ahmed Khan of Mahmudabad (U.P.); M. J. Jamal Moideen (Madras); K.M. Rahmatullah (Madras); Ahmed Ebrahim Haroon Jaffar (Bombay); Mohammed Mossa Killedar (Bombay); Seth Yusuf Abdulla Haroon (Bombay); Abdur Rahman Siddiqi (Bengal); Sir Hassan Suhrawardy (Bengal); Maulvi Tamizzuddin Khan (Bengal); Hajee Chowdhury Mohammed Ismail Khan (Bengal); Shaikh Rafiuddin Ahmad Siddique(Bengal); Shah Abdul Hamid (Assam); Sir Mohammed Yamin Khan (U.P.); Khan Bahadur Mohammed Ghazanfarullah (U.P.); Dr. Sir Zia Uddin Ahmed (U.P.); Syed Ghulam Bhik Nairang (Punjab); Maulana Zafar Ail Khan (Punjab); Hafiz Mohammed Abdullah (Punjab); Nawab Sir Mohammed Mehr Shah (Punjab); Capt. Syed Abid Hussain Shah (Punjab); Makhdum Haji Syed Sher Shah Jilani (Punjab); Mohammed Nauman (Orissa); Abid Hussain (Bihar); Khan Bahadur Habibur Rahman (Bihar); Nawab Siddique Ali Khan (C.P.); and Ali Asghar Khan (Assam). It will be noted that the first five are also members of the Working Committee.

4. M. Asaf Ali represents the joint constituency of Delhi and Khan Abdul Ghani Khan the joint constituency of the North-West Frontier Province. Several other Muslims are nominated members.

5. Journalists in New Delhi commonly speak of the low caliber of the present Assembly as compared with earlier ones.

He claims to be a Muslim first and a Muslim Leaguer afterwards; therefore, he would prefer to convert the Hindus to Islam rather than to divide India. He has a very low opinion of the Hindu religion as it is practiced. He believes that Muslims dare not permit domination by the Hindus and that they should have the right to rule where they are in a majority. He would not, however, favor a separate sovereign Pakistan, but rather a central authority with a local autonomy for the provinces. Siddiqi has long been interested in the Arab world; he was once a resident of Turkey. Sometimes he is said to be anti-American, but this probably is only an unwarranted inference based on his opposition to American policy in the Near East.[1]

Others who exert some influence in the Assembly are Liaquat Ali Khan, deputy leader; Essak Sait, chief whip of the Muslim League Assembly Party; Yusuf Haroon, assistant whip; Nawab Ismail Khan, chairman of the Committee of Action; Sir Mohammed Yamin Khan, Deputy President of the Assembly; the Raja of Mahmudabad; Mohammed Nauman; and Nawab Siddique Ali Khan, commander of the Muslim League National Guards.

Seth Yusuf Abdoola Haroon is a member for Sind in the Central Legislative Assembly. He is of a well-known Karachi family with industrial and trading interests, on whose behalf he visited the US a few years ago. He is now thirty years old; at twenty-eight he was mayor of Karachi. He is now less active politically in Sind than in Delhi, where he is on the sidelines of League national politics as a favorite of Jinnah. Haroon states privately that he sometimes disagrees with Jinnah in his heart, but he would never oppose him. Nevertheless, he believes that in these critical times Jinnah should seek the moral support of strong men who have their own ideas and should accept help from others, things which Jinnah will not do. Haroon says that, because he is a "blind Jinnah man," he should not be in high councils. As a matter of fact, Haroon has a natural inclination to compromise and is on friendly terms with people in all camps. In manner and conversation he is sophisticated and somewhat superficial. It does not seem likely that he would make any major personal sacrifices for the League, although he is a loyal member for the time being.[2]

The Raja of Mahmudabad is another younger man who privately disagrees with some of Jinnah's decisions but does not express these views openly out of respect for Jinnah, who is his guardian. Mahmudabad is an eccentric person with an odd assortment of interests. He is president of the All-India Muslim Student Federation; Yusuf Haroon, who is his friend, describes him as an extremist and a sort of fascist.[3]

Yamin Khan and Nauman have little influence in the party. Sir Zia-ud-din Ahmed is a recognized mathematician and educator, but is now usually considered too old to be of much use.

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1. Interviews with A.R. Siddiqi, Adam Siddiqi, and others.
2. Interview with Yusuf Haroon.
3. Interviews with Haroon and others.

In the deliberations of the Assembly, the tendency for the Muslim League Party to side with the Viceroy's Government largely disappeared. Cooperation between the League and the Congress which was conspicuous in the 1944-45 session was less marked in 1945-46. This was probably due in part to the antagonism between the League and the Congress following the Simla Conference in June-July 1945 and in part to the replacement of Bhulabhai Desai as leader of the Congress Assembly Party by Sarat Bose.[1] But in the recent Assembly opposing positions were taken, for example, on the finance bill which the League supported and the Congress attacked. Because Jinnah was out of town at the time that the bill came up for debate, the Leaguers in the Assembly did not dare to take a stand either in support of or opposition to the bill. For two days they had to take part in the debate without knowing which side they were on. This incident illustrates the limited authority exercised by Liaquat Ali who is titular deputy leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party.

2. Council of State. The present Council of State dates from 1936; it does not occupy an important place in Indian politics. The leader of the Muslim League Party in the Council is Hossain Imam, a landlord from Bihar where he is president of the provincial Muslim League. He is also a member of the Central Parliamentary Board.

3. Central Parliamentary Board. Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Liaquat Ali Khan, and Hossain Imam are the members of the Central Parliamentary Board.

Khaliq-uz-Zaman, one of the ablest Muslim leaders, was once prominent in the Congress, from which he resigned about 1935. He is leader of the Muslim League Party in the United Provinces Assembly. He is a quiet and serious man who gives the impression of sincerity. He holds that Muslims and Hindus are so different that they cannot form a united nation; that if there were some other means than Pakistan by which Muslim interests can be protected, the League would be willing to consider it; that the British will not protect the Muslims at the cost of their own interests; that the Labor Government in particular considers British commercial predominance in India as their first concern, and that to this end they are now conciliating the Hindus and the Congress. He feels the Americans understand neither the Muslim case nor British intentions.[2]

C. Provincial Organizations

Up to the present, provincial Muslim League organizations and policies have been dominated by the central "high command"

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1. Cooperation between Desai and Liaquat Ali had reached its culmination in the drafting of an agreement in the spring of 1945 for the reorganization of the Viceroy's Council with 40 percent representation for the Congress Party, 40 percent for the Muslim League, and 20 percent for minority groups.
2. Interviews with Khaliq-uz-Zaman and R.U. Singh.

even in strictly provincial matters.[1] The provincial organizations have usually needed the support of the center. Most of the interventions in provincial politics have been made in pursuit of the League's policy of maintaining party unity and of enlisting political leaders capable of delivering votes, sometimes at the sacrifice of the support of popular ideals and of the more active members of the League. However, as the important provincial leaders have usually also been members of the All-India Working Committee, a considerable measure of cooperation between the provincial organizations and the central headquarters has been maintained.

In spite of this domination by the center, it should be recognized that there are strong provincial loyalties in India which resist pressure from the outside. These provincial loyalties are now making themselves felt within the Muslim League, especially in Bengal and Sind. To date provincial particularism has been kept in check fairly well by the League command, but as the governments of the provinces take on more importance, provincial political leaders can be expected to carry more weight. The constitutional reforms now proposed would considerably augment provincial and regional autonomy, and if put into effect, the position of provincial leaders will be strengthened. In such an event, it is not improbable that such able men as Syed of Sind and Suhrawardy of Bengal might defy Jinnah openly.

In the provinces the men of importance are generally the officers of the provincial Leagues and the Muslim League party leaders in the legislatures, plus the Cabinet members in those provinces (Bengal and Sind) where the League is in power.

1. Muslim-Minority Provinces. In those provinces in which Muslims are a small minority -- Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, Bombay, and Madras -- Muslim League party leaders are likely to have only nuisance value.

However, the situation is rather different in the United Provinces where, although Muslims form only 15 percent of the population, they are economically and historically a powerful group, with 29 percent of the seats in the Legislative Assembly and 33 percent in the Council. The United Provinces has four representatives on the All-India Working Committee, all of them influential members[2] including Liaquat Ali Khan, Nawab Mohammed Ismail Khan, the president of the United Provinces Muslim League, acts as chairman of the Working Committee in Jinnah's absence and is also chairman of the Committee of Action. He was one of the four Muslim League leaders who negotiated with the British Cabinet Mission. Ismail Khan has steered clear of personal rivalries in the provincial League, and his strength appears to lie in his non-partisan attitude combined with personal ability. The Raja of Mahmudabad, one of the wealthiest landowners in the province, is treasurer of the All-India Working Committee. The fourth member from the United Provinces, Khaliq-uz-Zaman, who is also on the powerful Central Parliamentary Board, has been leader of the Muslim League Party in the lower house of the provincial legislature and chairman of the Lucknow Municipal Board. He has been

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1. The rebellion of G.M. Syed and the split in the Sind Muslim League illustrates this point. Syed objected to the Central Parliamentary Board's attempt to dictate the selection of candidates for the Sind Assembly, theoretically a perogative of the provincial Muslim League, of which Syed was president.

2. Dr. R.U. Singh is the chief source of the information on the United Provinces.

far more active in provincial politics than in politics within the Muslim League.

Nawab Aizaz Rasul became secretary of the United Provinces Muslim League after Rizwan Ullah was recently forced out of that office on unpublicized charges of graft and dishonesty. Most reports agree that Aizaz Rasul is not able but he has the favor of Nawab Ismail Khan as well as the support of a charming, intelligent, and influential wife who is a member of the upper house of the Legislature.

Among the Muslim Leaguers elected from the United Provinces to the Constituent Assembly are Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Ismail Khan, Begum Aizaz Rasul, and S.M. Rizwan Ullah.

2. Assam.[1] In Assam, which Jinnah claimed as part of Pakistan, Muslims constitute only one-third of the population. Because of the large tribal population, no community has a clear majority, but the Hindus form the largest single community. The most prominent League leader is Sir Muhammed Saadulla, who has been prime minister in various coalition governments between April 1937 and March 1945. Perhaps second in importance is Maulvi Abdul Matin Choudhury, also a member of the Assam Assembly and of all recent Cabinets in which the Muslim League has participated. A quiet, unassuming man, he has taken the lead in the Muslim fight to eliminate the Line system of land settlement in Assam, which established restricted areas in which immigrants from outside the province could settle.

Leaguers recently elected to the Constituent Assembly from Assam are Sir Muhammed Saadulla, Matin Choudhury, and Abdul Hamid, who is a member of the Assam Legislative Assembly from Sylhet Sadr. Other Muslim Leaguers taking a prominent part in Assam politics are Abdul Hamid Khan, Maulvi Munawwar Ali, Khan Bahadur Sayidur Rahman, and Khan Saheb Muddabir Hussain Chowdhury.

3. North-West Frontier Province.[2] In the North-West Frontier Province, where Muslims constituto 92 percent of the population, the League in 1946 was weakest. Neither of the party's representatives on the All-India Working Committee was a member of the newly elected provincial legislature; Sardar Aurungzeb Khan, a former Prime Minister, was not nominated and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, formerly Finance Minister, lost the election. Nishtar, who had been relatively unknown outside League circles, recently achieved distinction by being named by Jinnah as one of the four Muslim League negotiators with the Cabinet Mission[3] and subsequently by being named to the Viceroy's abortive Executive Council on June 16, 1946. As a result, he may enjoy increased importance. As for Aurungzeb Khan, it is not likely that he will ever be more than a figurehead.

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1. This section is based on interviews with Abdul Matin Choudhury and others.

2. This section is based on interviews with Aurungzeb Khan, Qazi Isa, Abdul Quayyum, Mohammed Shaghil, and others.

3. This selection was doubtless prompted by Congress's previous choice of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, of the North-West Frontier Province, as one of its negotiators.

Abdul Quayyum Khan, deputy leader of the Congress Party in the last Central Legislative Assembly, joined the Muslim League in 1945 on the eve of the election and was elected to the Provincial Assembly on the Muslim League ticket. He has ability and experience and made one of the outstanding speeches at the Muslim League convention in Delhi in April, in which he demanded action and urged Jinnah to give the call. Quayyum gives the impression of a wily politician, not overly scrupulous. He is said to have Communist sympathies.

Less important local leaders are Khan Sardar Bahadur Khan, speaker in the previous Assembly; Raja Abdur Rahman Khan, a retired superintendent of police; Raja Haider Zaman, a leading landlord; and Khan Mohammed Abbas Khan, who was a prominent member of the provincial Congress Party until 1945. Sardar Bahadur Khan has been elected to one of the three Constituent Assembly seats allotted to North-West Frontier Province; the other two went to the Congress Party.

4. Sind.[1] Sind, along with Bengal and the Punjab, may be considered the strongholds of the Muslim League because in these provinces it is the strongest single party.

A number of Sindis are prominent in All-India Muslim League ranks. Khan Bahadur M.A. Khuhro is a member of the Working Committee and a Minister in the present Sind Government. A large landholder, he was out of politics for a brief period recently while he was being tried -- and acquitted -- for the murder of the former prime minister, Allah Baksh(Bux). He will probably be the leader of the Muslim League in Sind in fact if not in name. The most prominent Muslim Leaguer is Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, the present Prime Minister. He is a man of wealth who apparently has but little ability and still less political stability but is a smooth and clever politician. It was said of him, "He would join the Hindu Mahasabha overnight if it would profit him."[2]

As a result of internal politics and Jinnah's unwillingness to sacrifice Hidayatullah and others, the Muslim League recently lost G.M. Syed, called by some the "only honest politician in Sind." Syed was the provincial League president and also leader of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly. He is a man of considerable ability and is generally respected. He is a socialist. In his political activity he has appealed to the masses and he claims he has won their support. While a member of the Muslim League Working Committee (1941-45) he was encouraged to voice his differences with Jinnah, who had told him that if young leaders would come forward he would get rid of the old reactionaries, referring particularly to Sir Ghulam Hussain. Syed was formerly a member of the Congress, which he says he left in 1938 because the Congress high command, especially Patel, insisted upon dictating in provincial matters which Syed felt they did not understand.

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1. This section is based on interviews with M.S. Khuhro; G.M. Syed; Nizami, editor of the Muslim League paper in Lahore; Prof. Chiblani of the College in Karachi; and others.

2. Other ministers in the present Muslim League government are Pir Illahi Baksh Mawapali and Gluhamali Khan Talpur.

He left the Muslim League for similar reasons in 1945, when the Central Parliamentary Board overruled the provincial League in naming candidates for the Assembly.

Syed is now leader of a rival group, which he claims is the authentic Muslim League of Sind. His party was, however, able to elect only four representatives, including Syed, to the Provincial Assembly. This group has joined with Congress and the Moulla Baksh group to form a coalition party, of which Syed was named leader. The non-League Muslims were not sufficiently strong, however, to elect any of the Muslim representatives to the Constituent Assembly.

During the Cabinet Mission negotiations in New Delhi in April 1946, Syed met with leaders of other Muslim minority parties who sought in vain to unite on a constitutional formula to propose to the Mission. The formula which was sponsored by Syed provided for virtual sovereignty for the provinces. Syed believes that civil war is inevitable, partly because the Muslim League has built up its strength and position on the issue of communalism.

When Syed resigned and was later expelled from the Muslim League in December 1945, his successor as president of the Sind Muslim League was M.H. Gazdar, a former follower.

The Muslim League elected all three Muslim representatives from Sind to the Constituent Assembly — M.A. Khuhro, M.H. Gazdar, and Pirzada Abdus Sattar, who was a minister in the coalition cabinet formed in 1941.

5. Punjab. The Muslim League has a strong organization in the Punjab; in 1945 it elected all but one of the sixteen Muslim representatives from the Punjab to the Constituent Assembly. However the League must contend with important opposition groups within the Muslim community.

The president of the Punjab Provincial League and leader of the League members in the provincial Assembly is the Nawab Iftikhar Hussain of Mamdot, who also is a member of the All-India Working Committee. Mamdot, the largest landowner in the Punjab, is a man of about forty who is amiable and liked by all factions of the League. His abilities are limited, however, and he is inexperienced in public affairs; he is probably incapable of opposing Jinnah on any issue.[1] It is alleged that his subserviency and his contribution of a lakh of rupees to the League led Jinnah to select him as the League leader in the Punjab.[2]

The most widely known Leaguer in the province is Sir Firoz Khan Noon, who was a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council and of the Indian delegation to the United Nations conference at San Francisco. Prior to the 1945-46 elections, he resigned his official positions, joined the Muslim League, and ran successfully for a seat in the Punjab Assembly. It was expected in some quarters that he would be selected as leader of the League in the province, but thus far he has not been selected for any League office. He did, however, participate in the meetings of the central Council in Delhi in April 1946 and in Bombay in July. At the latter session he advocated

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1. Interviews with Mamdot, Begam Shsh Nawaz, Mrs. Latifi, Yusuf Haroon, and others.

2. According to Yusuf Haroon, if the Punjab League could have made its own selection, first choice would have been Sir Firoz Khan Noon, second Ghazanfar Ali Khan, third Doultana or Shaukat Hyat, and then Mamdot.

boycotting both the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly and at the same time renounced his British titles. He is dramatic and charming, but generally considered unreliable.

Shaukat Hyat Khan, a former leader of the Muslim League Assembly members, is the son of the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan. Out of respect for his father, Shaukat Hyat was made a minister in the Unionist cabinet in the Punjab, but was later forced out by the Prime Minister, an action which caused a storm in the Assembly. Many Unionists thereupon joined the Muslim League opposition group under Shaukat Hyat's leadership.

One of the few prominent women in the Muslim League, Begam Shah Nawaz, comes from the Punjab. She belongs to a prominent family, has traveled widely, is active in the All-India Women's Conference, and is a member of the Provincial Assembly. She is charming personally and an effective politician, although her close association with British officialdom must make her suspect in nationalist circles.

Outstanding among the younger members and potential future leaders of the Punjab League are Mian Mumtaz Mohammed Khan Daultana and Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din. Daultana, a wealthy landowner, is now secretary of the Punjab Muslim League and perhaps its ablest member. Iftikhar-ud-Din, while a Communist sympathiser, was an officer in the National Congress until 1945, when he was influenced by Daultana to join the League. The left-wing tendencies of these men will probably condition the future program of the League in the Punjab.

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Sheikh Karamat Ali, and Mian Bashir Ahmed, members of the All-India Working Committee, are other important leaders in the Punjab League.

In its appeal for the support of the Muslim community, the Punjab League is opposed by Muslims in the Unionist Party. Its leader, Malik Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana, was Premier in 1946, heading a coalition ministry composed of Congress, Sikh, and Unionist members. However, Muslim support of the Unionists declined sharply. While there were 73 Muslim Unionists in the Assembly in 1937, there are only 11 in 1946.

6. Bengal. In Bengal the leadership of the Muslim League has recently been assumed by Sir Husseyn Suhrawardy, nephew of Sir Hassan Suhrawardy and at present a member of the Central Assembly. Shaheed Suhrawardy is a very clever politician and is considered quite unscrupulous. It is doubtful if he would desert the Muslim League, but he would probably willingly oppose Jinnah, especially if he thought that Bengal was being dominated by or its interests sacrificed by the "high command." He is an able organizer and is building up an effective party machine for his support. He is an orator of the fire-eating variety, but privately talks political sense. The 1946 Government of Bengal did a poor job of food procurement and distribution so that Suhrawardy, the then Premier, was placed in a very uncomfortable position.[1]

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1. Interviews with Suhrawardy, A.R. Siddiqi, Ispahani, Aslam Siddiqi Nizami, and others. Other members of the present Bengal Ministry are Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ali, Khan Bahadur Syed M. Hossein, Ahmed Hossein, Khan Bahadur Abdul Gofran, Khan Bahadur A.F.M. Abdur Rahman, and Shamsuddin Ahmed.

The best known Muslim League leader of Bengal is Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin, former Premier and leader of the Muslim League Party in the Bengal Assembly. He is considered "a gentleman" but has demonstrated little ability. A. R. Siddiqi described him as affable, very religious, but mentally below par. Although he is a loyal follower of Jinnah, he is one of the few on the Working Committee who will occasionally express his disagreement with the master.

Nazimuddin comes from a Dacca family of Persian origin, a rival of wealthy Bengali families. He is said to be backed politically by British and other vested interests. Recently he made a public speech in London in which he spoke favorably of a central government for India, contrary to the Muslim League demand for a sovereign Pakistan.[1] Nazimuddin did not apply for nomination in the recent elections, in spite of his friends' urging, in order to avoid a battle within the League between himself and Suhrawardy, who was determined to be Prime Minister. He was temporarily removed from the scene by Jinnah who nominated him as a member of the food delegation.

Other important figures in Bengal politics are the Ispahanis, members of the largest Muslim commercial firm in India and large contributors to the League. The younger brother, M.A.H. Ispahani, is more interested in politics than is the older.

A.R. Siddiqi is prominent in business, publishing and politics in Bengal. He is editor of the Morning News, a Muslim newspaper. It is said that Siddiqi was willing to become editor of Dawn, the official Muslim League paper, but that Jinnah would not agree. He is a political friend of Nazimuddin. In the recent campaign of S. M. Osman, a Muslim Leaguer, for election to the mayoralty of Calcutta, he was supported by Suhrawardy but opposed by Siddiqi's paper, the Morning News, which accused Osman of having the backing of the Congress Party.[2]

Abdul Kasam Fuzlul Huq, a prominent politician and former Premier of Bengal, broke with the Muslim League Party a few years ago. He has since approached the party for reinstatement, but Jinnah will not accept him.

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1. However, he renounced his British titles in July 1946.
2. REF - 095.4/2164/744, May 11, 1946.

III. NATIONAL AND SECTIONAL STRENGTH

A. Provincial Elections of 1946

For some years past the Muslim League claimed that it had the support of an overwhelming proportion of the Muslims of India[1] and therefore asserted the right to be the sole spokesman of the Muslim community. This contention was denied by the National Congress, whose membership included a considerable number of Muslims and whose top organization included several prominent Muslims.[2] There were also a number of exclusively Muslim political organizations, such as the Khudai Khidmatgars, the Ahrar Party, the Momin Conference, the Shia Political Conference, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, each of which repudiated the claim of the Muslim League to speak for all Muslims.

The Muslim electorate had had its last previous opportunity to indicate its choice of political parties in the provincial elections of 1936. At that time the Muslim League was just emerging as a major political force, and it was able to elect only 109 candidates among the 492 seats in the provincial legislatures assigned to Muslim constituencies. However the League's growing strength was indicated by its success in winning most of the by-elections for Muslim seats which subsequently become vacant.

The British decision to hold provincial elections in early 1946 afforded an opportunity for the League to establish definitively its position as exclusive representative of the Muslim community. Provincial campaigns were hurriedly organized and in some constituencies Aligarh University students conducted house-to-house canvasses. The platform was Pakistan and the slogan "Islam in danger."

Polling took place between January and mid-April. When the final results were tabulated the Muslim League had won 428 of the 492 Muslim seats, or 87 percent. A tabulation of the votes cast in the Muslim constituencies indicates that Muslim League candidates polled 74 percent of the total (see Table). However, no polling took place in constituencies where candidates were unopposed, thus preventing Muslims in those constituencies from recording their preference for the Muslim League or other Muslim organizations. As available data indicates that more Muslim League candidates (44) were returned unopposed than were Muslim candidates of other parties, and as it may be assumed that the Muslim League's following was overwhelming in the constituencies where its candidates were unopposed, it appears that its popular strength is somewhat above 74 percent.

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1. Individual leaders claimed the League was supported by 90 or even 99 percent of India's Muslims.
2. Smith, op.cit., pp. 242-54

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Table. RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS FOR PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES, 1946

	(1) Total Population[a] (in thousands)	(2) Muslim Population[a] (in thousands)	(3) Col. 2 as percent of Col. 1	(4) Total Votes Polled (in thousands)	(5) Votes Polled in Muslim Constituencies[b] (in thousands)	(6) Votes for Muslim League Candidates[b] (in thousands)	(7) Col. 6 as percent of Col. 5	(8) Muslim Seats	(9) Won by League Unopposed	(10) Total Seats Won by League	(11) Muslim Seats as percent of Total Seats	(12) Muslim League Seats as percent of Total Seats
Punjab	28,419	16,217	57.	2,076	1,044	680.0	66	86	2	75	49.1	43
Sind	4,535	3,208	70.8	448	342	206.0	60	34	1	27	56.7	43
N.W.F.P.	3,038	2,789	91.8	378	355	147.0	41	36		17	72.0	34
Assam	10,205	3,442	33.7		217[c]	148.0	73	34	1	31	31.5	29
Bengal	60,306	33,005	54.7	5,399	2,387	1,998.0	84	119	12	113	47.6	45
United Provinces	55,021	8,416	15.3	2,140	800	523.0	65	66	2	54	28.9	24
Central Provinces and Berar	16,814	784	4.6	880	57	47.0	83	14	3	13	12.5	12
Bihar	36,340	4,716	13.0	1,063	198	146.0	74	40	2	34	26.3	22
Orissa	8,728	146	1.7	82	5	4.5	90	4	1	4	.6	7
Bombay	20,850	1,920	9.2	4,875[d]	277	251.0	91	30	7	30	17.1	17
Madras	49,342	3,896	7.9	3,309	331	308.0	93	29	13	29	13.5	13
	293,598	78,539	26.8	20,650	6,013	4,498.5	74	492	44	427	31	27

(Footnotes and Sources on following page)

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Table. RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS FOR PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES, 1946 (Continued)

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a. Census of 1941.
b. Includes only votes in constituencies where seats are contested. No polling takes place in constituencies where candidates are unopposed.
c. Only 16 constituencies reported.
d. Includes plural votes.

Sources: Press Information Bureau, Government of India; S. Subramanian, statistician in the Office of the Economic Adviser, Government of India.

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Analysis of the election results by provinces indicates that the Muslim League's strength varies inversely with the proportion of Muslims to the total population. The Muslims in the predominantly Hindu provinces of central and southern India, which would become a part of Hindustan in the event of partition, are ardent proponents of Pakistan and of the Muslim League. Cynics hold that these Muslims can afford to agitate for the creation of a Muslim state since they will not be affected personally. Muslim Leaguers take the view that such Muslims are motivated either by purely patriotic motives or by the belief that the establishment of a strong Muslim state will improve their status in Hindu-dominated areas.

In the Muslim-majority provinces, on the other hand, Muslims are less conscious of the reality or probability of Hindu domination and therefore are neither united in supporting the Muslim League or in accepting the Pakistan program.

Although the League won 87 percent of the Muslim seats in the provincial legislatures, a combination of unfavorable circumstances deprived it of a clear majority in any of the provincial legislatures. While the League virtually swept the board in Muslim-minority provinces, it did not have sufficient number of seats to influence those provincial legislatures. In the provinces with predominantly Muslim populations, the weightage system adopted by the British for allotting seats in the provincial legislatures gives disproportionate representation to non-Muslim minorities.[1] As a result, although Muslims are in a majority in the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Punjab, and Bengal, only in the first two provincial legislatures are the Muslims allotted a majority of the seats. As the Muslim League is comparatively weaker in these very provinces, it failed to win clear majorities in these assemblies. There remained the possibility of forming coalitions with other parliamentary groups; by enlisting non-Muslim representatives, chiefly European, the League was able to form ministries in Sind and Bengal.

B. Central and Southern Provinces

In Madras, Bombay, Orissa, the Central Provinces and Berar, and the United Provinces - where Muslims are in the minority - the League made a very good showing, taking all but 19 of the 183 Muslim seats. It secured all Muslim seats in Madras, Bombay and Orissa, and all but one in the Central Provinces and Berar. The "weightage system" used in distributing legislative seats gives the Muslims in these provinces representation far out of proportion to their actual numbers. For example, in the United Provinces, the Muslims constitute about 15 percent of the population but are assigned 29 percent of the legislative seats.[2] The Muslim League bloc can, under such circumstances, make its influence felt, especially by combining with other minority groups.

It should be noted that the Muslim League fared relatively

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1. In allotting legislative seats, the British consciously weighted the representation of minority groups to enable them to protect themselves against the majority.
2. Compare cols. 3 and 11, Table.

poorly in the United Provinces, the historical heart of Muslim culture in India, winning only 65 percent of the popular Muslim vote. Fourteen percent of the Muslim vote went to Congress candidates and another 14 percent to pro-Congress Nationalist Muslims. The League's weak showing may be attributed to the strength of religious orthodoxy which diverted votes to Nationalist Muslim candidates, conflicts between Sunnis and Shias which swung votes to the Shia Political Conference, and recent internal dissensions in the provincial League organization.

C. Northwestern Provinces

The northwestern provinces are of prime importance to the Muslim League as they are areas in which Muslims are clearly in the majority. The election results showed that the League was relatively weak in the North-West Frontier Province where the Muslims are 91.8 percent of the population, stronger in Sind where the Muslims constitute 70.8 percent, and still stronger in the Punjab where the Muslims have a slight edge (57.1 percent) over Hindus, Sikhs, and others.

1. North-West Frontier Province. The Muslim League made its poorest showing in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) polling 41 percent of the Muslim votes cast and winning fewer than half the Muslim seats, none being uncontested. Here the League was faced by a virile opposition, the Khudai Khidmatgars ("Servants of God"), founded by the well-known Muslim leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The "Red Shirts," as they are popularly called, are not technically affiliated with the National Congress,[1] but they support the Congress program. Abdul Ghaffar Khan is a member of an old landed Pathan clan with great influence among the tribesmen of the northwest. His movement, which is socialist in character, has a wide following in the province.[2] The League leaders by comparison had no program or record of service for the popular welfare of the people to compete with the Khudai Khidmatgars.

Another cause of the League's weakness is its poor organization and inefficient leadership.[3] Although Qazi Isa spent much of 1945 in a campaign to organize the Muslim League in the NWFP, his success was limited. Sardar Aurungzeb Khan, who was leader of the provincial League was so weak that he was not put forward as a candidate. He had been Muslim League Premier of a coalition government in May 1943 when the Congress leaders were in prison, ending a period of direct rule by the governor. In March 1945, when most of the Congress members of the Assembly had been released from prison, a motion of no-confidence against his cabinet was carried. His administration was allegedly both inefficient and corrupt.

The League's cry of "Islam in danger" made little impression

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1. However, Abdul Ghaffar Khan is a member of the All-India Congress Working Committee.
2. Interviews with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his son, Abdul Ghani Khan.
3. Interviews with Abdul Qadir, Haroon, and others.

in the province, especially among the Pathans who do not fear the menace of Hindu domination.[1] The sterility of the League's program in 1946 was indicated by its failure to appreciate the situation in the NWFP and to frame other lines of argument to win the Pathans.

Most of the Muslim League candidates elected to the NWFP Assembly come from Hazara District, which is contiguous with and closely akin to the Punjab. In addition, the League won two of the three urban constituencies, and three from south of Bannu. Thus the election results indicate that the Pathan regions, which include most of the area along the Afghan frontier, are predominantly non-League or anti-League, and that the League strength is confined to the Indian (as opposed to Pathan) area northeast of Peshawar. This has led to the suggestion that should the people of the frontier districts reject the establishment of Pakistan, Hazara District might be transferred to the Punjab.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan's attitude toward Pakistan is unclear, as well as that of his brother, Dr. Khan Saheb, Prime Minister of the present Congress government. It is rumored that the latter told the Cabinet Mission that the NWFP would go with the Muslims in case Pakistan were established but he has also prophesied civil war.[2] Ghaffar Khan considers the Muslim League leadership to be composed of nawabs and landlords opposed to the socialist principles implied in the Koran. He insists that if a plebiscite were held the NWFP, even Hazara District would refuse to join an independent Pakistan. However, with regard to the grouping of provinces he has stated in his weekly newspaper, "the Grouping System was first suggested with my consent and approval to placate the League. But I still hold that every province has an option whether to join a particular group or not. ... If we can at all be grouped with any set of provinces it is with the Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan and with no other."[3]

2. Sind. In Sind, where Muslims constitute 71 percent of the population, Muslim League candidates received 60 percent of the popular vote, with one League candidate returned unopposed. The League's poor showing in this province may be attributed to lack of political imagination in framing a program and conducting a campaign.

Sindis are notoriously provincial in their outlook. Having been freed in 1936 from the domination of Bombay,[4] they are afraid of becoming a mere appendage of the Punjab. Therefore provincial autonomy has a stronger appeal than does the Muslim League's design for Pakistan, in which the Punjab would doubtless become the center, with Lahore as the capital. Nevertheless the League fought the Sind election with Pakistan as its sole platform.

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1. Interview with Abdul Ghani Khan.
2. Interview with Khaliq-uz-Zaman and Dr. Khan Saheb.
3. Government of India Information Cable, July 29, 1946.
4. Sind was a part of Bombay until 1936, when it became a separate province.

There were two Muslim opposition parties in the field, one of some years' standing led by Moulla Baksh and the other a new group split from the provincial Muslim League and led by G. M. Syed.[1] Moulla Baksh leads the remnants of the followers of his brother, Allah Baksh, the most able and prominent Muslim in recent Sind politics, who was active in organizing a Nationalist Muslim movement against the Muslim League until his murder in 1943.

G. M. Syed was president of the Sind Muslim League when in late 1945 the provincial parliamentary board selected its candidates for legislative seats. The Central Parliamentary Board disapproved of several of the candidates, whom it considered too young and liberal, and replaced them with experienced and conservative political figure. G. M. Syed had long been opposed to the League "high command's" support of recognized leaders, such as Sir Ghulam Hussain Hiyadatullah,[2] considered by Syed as reactionaries whose wealth and conservatism would alienate mass support for the League. In an earlier interview with Jinnah, Syed believed that he had been promised that the older figures would be weeded out in the next legislative elections. However, when that time came the "high command" supported the vested interests on the ground that their support was essential in this critical election. Thereupon Syed resigned from the League (December 1945) and formed his own party.[3]

When the balloting was over, the Muslim League had won twenty-seven seats, the Moulla Baksh group four, Syed's dissident Leaguers four, the Congress Party eighteen, and four seats went to independents. In addition there are three European seats, making a total of sixty in the Assembly. Soon after the election the two smaller Muslim groups combined with the Congress members and the independents to form a Coalition Party controlling twenty-nine seats (one member defected to the League), as against the Muslim League's twenty-eight. The Coalition Party expected to be called upon by the Governor, Sir Francis Mudie, to form the government, but when G.M. Syed, the Coalition leader, was called to the Governor's office, he was surprised to hear Sir Francis suggest that he rejoin the Muslim League and support Pakistan. The Governor subsequently asked Hiyadatullah to form a League cabinet, which he was able to do with the support of the three European members.

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1. See Chapter II, Section C, 4, above.
2. See OIR-4162.2 pp. 2-3, for biographical sketch.
3. Syed stated that he received many communications after his resignation. The majority threatened him if he persisted in his opposition to the "high command"; a smaller group said in effect, "You are honest, but you should obey the high command;" while the remainder inferred, "You are right, but you should fight the high command from within the League." Almost none approved his course of action. It is probable that this is an accurate survey of Muslim League opinion.

Despite the defection of several members, the League cabinet succeeded in remaining in office for some time by preventing any motion of no confidence from reaching the floor.

3. Punjab. The League fought a vigorous - and sometimes bitter - campaign in the Punjab, motivated by the realization that the province was the keystone of the projected state of Pakistan and by antipathy to the Muslims in the Unionist Party[1] for cooperating with the National Congress and splitting the Muslim community. During the campaign the League enlisted many new recruits who had formerly belonged to the Communist, Congress, or Unionist parties. Mian Iftikharuddin, Begam Shah Nawaz and Nawab Maj Mohammed Mumtaz Khan, of the powerful Tiwana family, were outstanding apostates from Unionism.

The election results in 1946 were gratifying to the League, as its candidates received 66 percent of the popular vote in Muslim constituencies and took 75 of the 86 Muslim seats. Congress did not take a single Muslim seat, while the Unionists were successful in capturing only seven. In the Assembly, however, the Muslim League's 75 seats was 12 below a controlling majority. The other parties - Unionist, Sikh Akali - and independents together formed a coalition government headed by Khizr Hyat.

D. Northeastern Provinces

1. Assam. While Muslims constitute only one-third of Assam's population as a whole, the Muslim proportion is slightly under 50 percent in Goalpura District and rises to 61 percent in Sylhet District. The Muslim League polled 73 percent of the Muslim vote throughout the province, but only 62 percent in Sylhet District. League candidates took 31 of the 34 Muslim seats, losing two of them in Sylhet. Thus the pattern of League weakness and strength within Assam conforms to that throughout India as a whole.

Although the Muslim League has often participated in coalition cabinets in Assam in the past, Congress won an absolute majority in the 1944 elections and formed the government.

2. Bengal. In the early stages of the campaign in Bengal, Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin, leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party, tried to push Sir H. S. Suhrawardy, the deputy leader, into the background. But Suhrawardy, a skilled but unscrupulous politician, was able to maneuver the selection of members of the provincial

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1. The Unionist Party, which held sway in the province for about ten years, is composed of Muslims and Hindus (chiefly from the Ambala Division) and is supported by the Sikh Akali Party. Under the leadership of the eminent Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, who died in 1942, the Unionist party was more powerful in the Punjab than the Muslim League. Many Muslims belonged to both parties until 1944, when the Unionists definitely broke with the League. The League subsequently increased its power at the Unionist Party's expense, until the latter virtually disintegrated. Khizr Hyat, the Unionist leader, was Prime Minister in 1946 but his real support comes from the Congress.

Parliamentary Board, so that his followers were in the majority. Although Nazimuddin is a loyal follower of Jinnah, the League's "high command" did not interfere, apparently believing that Suhrawardy was too valuable to displace. Nazimuddin decided not to run for the Assembly, leaving the field open to Suhrawardy.

The League achieved a striking success in Bengal, where slightly over half the population (54.7 percent) is Muslim. Polling 84 percent of the Muslim vote, the League took 113 of the 119 Muslim seats, as well as several special seats, e.g., Dacca University, Muslim Chamber of Commerce. Four of the Muslim seats (5 percent of the popular vote) went to the Krishak Praja Party, led by Fuzlul Huq. With assistance from minority groups, the League formed the government, headed by Suhrawardy as Prime Minister.

IV. PROGRAM AND TACTICS

A. Exclusive Representation

The central objective of the Muslim League is to achieve recognition as the sole representative of the Muslims in India. All political decisions must be consistent with this policy. When the League began to claim an exclusive position for itself, the existence of other substantial Muslim organizations made the claim seem absurd. However, it has now, except in the North-West Frontier Province, established its claim.

The basic appeal which the League holds out to aspirants for political office has been that it gave promise of obtaining for Muslims a larger degree of participation in government than they could expect under Congress Party domination. It is no coincidence that Jinnah was able to muster increased League support in the period following the provincial elections of 1936 and especially after the Congress Party ministries withdrew from the provincial governments in 1940 and left the field open to the Muslims. If Jinnah can now establish the rule that no Muslim could attain office except under the aegis of the League, he will virtually force out of the Congress Party all Muslim members interested in politics or in government service as a career.

A recent illustration of Muslim League policy is furnished by the post-election negotiations carried on by the Congress Party for the establishment of ministries in the provinces where it has a majority. The Congress, perhaps remembering and profiting by its experiences in 1937 when it alienated the Muslim League by nominating only Congress Party Muslims to high offices, invited the League to nominate members of the cabinets being formed. In every case, the Congress observed its own fundamental policy that it is not a communal body by nominating at least one Nationalist Muslim from its own ranks. This action alienated the Muslim League, which will not recognize the bona fides of a non-League Muslim, and therefore it refused to join in forming cabinets in Assam and the United Provinces.

Similarly, in provinces where the League was trying to form a government by coalition, it invited the Congress Party to cooperate by naming a specified number of Hindu ministers. Congress refused to be restricted to selecting only Hindus. The situation was particularly trying for the League in the Punjab, where its party bloc is the largest in the Assembly and where it was

especially eager to form a government. Protracted negotiations took place between Mandot and Bhim Sachar, leader of the Punjab Congress Party, who were closely controlled by Jinnah and Azad respectively. Although the Congress had only one Muslim member in the Assembly who was neither distinguished nor experienced in government, it insisted upon nominating him for a ministerial position. The League, in turn would not yield even at the cost of losing control of the Punjab government.

The League's claim to exclusiveness was enunciated by Jinnah at the Simla Conference of June-July 1945. The Congress had practically conceded the League's demand for parity of Muslims with Caste Hindus on the Viceroy's Executive Council, but insisted upon the right to name one of the Muslims. Jinnah would not allow the Congress Party to name a Muslim, or the Viceroy to name a non-League Muslim to the government, and on this issue the conference broke down.

Again in June 1946 negotiations for setting up an interim government broke down, primarily on the same issue. Jinnah claimed that the League accepted the Viceroy's proposals on the understanding that it would name all the Muslim members. Chiefly on the same ground the Congress Party rejected the proposal. This policy of the League is more fundamental than its demand for parity, which it compromised in accepting both the constitutional and interim government proposals of the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy.

The League's policy of exclusiveness has led it to repudiate all non-cooperating Muslims as kaffirs or infidels. Hossain-boy Lalljee, president of the Shia Political Conference, claims to have been a life-long acquaintance and friend of Jinnah, but says now they cannot now meet because Jinnah calls all non-League Shias infidels. It is well known that Jinnah, as president of the Muslim League, has been willing to meet Gandhi but unwilling to meet Maulana Azad, perhaps the most distinguished Muslim scholar in India, but also a Congress leader. The fact that he has for several years been President of the Congress Party has increased the difficulty of a political settlement between the Congress and the League.

In the Punjab, coalition with the Congress Party or the Akali Sikhs was sought by the Muslim League. But the League did not seek a coalition with the Unionists, a party led by a non-League Muslim. The League sees no inherent difficulty in coming to terms with its external political enemies, such as the Congress or even the Hindu Mahasabha but, at the same time, will not seek an agreement with another Muslim group on any other terms than absolute surrender.

Actually, the Muslim League is becoming increasingly representative of the Indian Muslim community, partly by the adherence of Muslims formerly non-political or non-partisan, and partly by defections to it from other parties. Gradually, the numerous Nationalist Muslim parties have been losing influence.[1] This development was emphasized by the procedure

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1. This is due in part to their inability to sink their own differences and present a united front - as was attempted in the Azad Muslim Conference.

of the British Cabinet Mission in confining major negotiations to the Congress and the League; leaders of minor groups had only interviews with the Mission.

B. Internal Unity

The Muslim League demands internal unity and unquestioning loyalty of all its members.[1] The structure of the League is theoretically democratic, with a heirarchy of representative bodies elected on the lower level by the entire membership. It is common knowledge, however, that Jinnah's will is the controlling force in the all-important Working Committee. The fact that a body appointed by the President is actually the executive authority of the League is in itself significant. Local and provincial leaders must have the approval of the "high command." The Central Parliamentary Board, a small sub-committee of the Working Committee, inspects the credentials of the nominees of the provincial boards and rejects those which it thinks less valuable to the Muslim League than other candidates would be. As a result, the League appears to be a well-knit body with a single voice. It is taken for granted that anyone who differs with Jinnah or tries to take an independent course has no political future within the League. It is suspected that some of the present leaders are more moderate in their political views than is Jinnah, but party loyalty demands that they follow the party line closely.

C. Communalism

The Muslim League is avowedly a fighting communal organization. Its purpose is to protect and advance Muslim interests. It has, therefore, demanded such concessions as separate electorates and reservation of posts for Muslims. By emphasizing communalism the League has gradually advanced to the position that the Muslims are a separate national people and must have a separate sovereign state.[2]

The demand for Pakistan now overshadows or engulfs all other demands. It is obvious that such an all-inclusive aim, though vague as to its outline and character, has provided an effective rallying cry and has been a tremendous political asset. Jinnah has used this asset to the full. He deliberately kept the concept on the emotional plane, postponing as long as possible any definition or delimitation. Even today, after he has been forced to describe his concept in greater detail, the word signifies to Muslims in general a vague world where Muslims are "on top." For some, this is thought of in terms of economic advancement. For others, it is probably a state in the governance of which Muslims are again in a place of authority as they were when the Moghuls ruled over the Hindus. It is surprising how frequently Muslims refer to their historical position in vindicating the establishment of a Muslim state. Liaquat Ali, in

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1. See oath of allegiance adopted by the Convention of Muslim League Legislators in 1946, Appendix C.
2. The first official endorsement of Pakistan was made by the League in the Lahore Resolution in 1940. (See Appendix A for text.)

response to various questions on the Muslim League position, once said, "I have ceased to argue with Americans about Pakistan. I simply state, 'There are ninety million Muslims[1] who refuse to live under the domination of Hindus; what do you intend to do about it?'"[2]

Even the ablest of the Muslim Leaguers express fear for the continued existence of the Muslim community within India.[3] A. R. Siddiqi said, in regard to a Muslim-Hindu settlement, that one must remember three background facts: (1) the extermination of the Buddhists by the Hindus;[4] (2) the submergence of the outcastes for 2,000 years by the Hindus; and (3) the caste system. In view of these facts, he felt that the Muslims must face extermination if they allowed Hindu domination. Khaliq-uz-zaman stated that Muslims in the minority provinces stand for Pakistan for the sake of Islam; they realize that they will themselves be exterminated eventually, but it is a personal sacrifice they make for the sake of the future of Muslims in India.

Leaders of the Muslim League frequently say that Pakistan will be a form of socialist state organized on the line laid down in the Koran. In practice, however, the formulation of specific social and economic reforms is postponed. Perhaps in response to criticism of the League on the grounds that it has no constructive program, it has from time to time issued statements embodying its views. As early as 1937 the Session passed a resolution[5] directing the Working Committee "to frame and put into effect an economic social and educational program" for a number of specified objectives, including the following:

> To fix working hours for factory workers and other labourers.
>
> To fix minimum wages.
>
> To improve housing - and make provision for slum clearance.
>
> To reduce rural and urban debts and abolish usury.

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1. According to the 1941 Census, there are about 80 million Muslims in British India, of whom about 60 million are in the area claimed for Pakistan.
2. In a private conversation with the author.
3. Interviews with Siddiqi and Khaliq-uz-zaman.
4. It should be noted that although the possibility of persecution of Buddhists in various parts of India is not ruled out, recognized historians observe that India turned back to Hinduism from Buddhism partly because most of the Indian princes were Hindu and partly as a result of Hindu assimilation of Buddhism. In fact, the final disappearance of Buddhism was assisted by the first Muslim invasion of India about 1000 AD.
5. Resolution no. 14, Lucknow Session of the All-India Muslim League, October 15-18, 1937; moved by the Raja of Mahmudabad.

To obtain security of tenure and fixation of fair rents and revenue.

To encourage use of Swadeshi[1] articles specially handwoven cloth.

To establish an industrial board for development of industries.

To advance compulsory primary education.

The manifesto adopted by the Punjab Working Committee in 1944[2] and signed by the Nawab of Mamdot as president and by Mumtaz Daultana as secretary, for example, reflected the socialist ideas of Daultana, himself a socialist. It advocated the nationalization of key industries and banks, state responsibility for employment, compulsory primary education, and state assistance to agriculture. To what extent such pronouncements can be taken as indicating the future action of the Muslims when they are in power one cannot say. The past record of Muslim League governments in the provinces as well as the financial interests of many of the leaders makes it appear doubtful that a liberal program will be undertaken in the near future.

For the time being Pakistan and communal welfare alone are taken seriously. For example, the Muslim League opposes the proposal of the new Congress Party government in the United Provinces to abolish the zamindari (landlord) system as a part of a program of land reform on the grounds that it is actually an anti-Muslim measure. In the United Provinces the Muslims own more than their share of land and have practically no industrial or commercial investment. They ask why land reform should be the first reform proposed, with no corresponding reform at the cost of Hindu industrial property.

Another case is furnished by Muslim League opposition to new government scheme for educational reform, popularly known as the Sargent Plan, which calls for compulsory primary education. A government education official stated that the Sargent Committee learned confidentially that the real reason for the League's opposition is its belief that the plan would undermine the argument for Pakistan by doing away with the comparative backwardness of the Muslim community.[3]

D. Adherence to Constitutional Methods

It has often been pointed out that Jinnah is a confirmed constitutionalist and that it would be contrary to his nature for him to pursue political objectives by unconstitutional means. Many Indians believe that Jinnah and others in the "high command" are incapable of leading successfully a revolutionary movement, and that leadership would quickly fall into other hands if the Muslims embarked on a campaign of violence. In any case, up to

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1. Made in India.
2. Manifesto of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, 1944 (Delhi, Danyal Latifi, 1944).
3. Interview with Dr. D. M. Sen, Deputy Director of Education and Secretary of the Sargent Committee.

the present the League has confined its agitation to those measures permitted by law, and very few members have been imprisoned for political activity on behalf of the League. This is in marked contrast to the Congress Party; admission to the inner circles of the Congress is virtually limited to those who have served at least one term in prison for political agitation.

This difference between the two parties may be attributed to the contrast between the character of the irrespective leaderships and to their relationships to the government. It has been aptly said that the Congress Party fights the Government while the Muslim League fights the Congress Party. At least until the advent of the Labor Party in the UK, there was a general belief in India that the British favored the minorities, specifically the Muslims. In such a situation, the Muslim League had little to gain by antagonizing the Government. However, the recent shift of power in the UK which displaced the Conservatives, who have been the closest friends of the Muslims, has led the League to reexamine its position on the use of unconstitutional methods against the Government of India.

At the meeting of the Muslim League Council in Delhi in April 1946, there was much talk of "baring breasts to bullets", and at the July meeting in Bombay the Council adopted a resolution favoring "direct action." The Resolution stated that "due to the intransigeance of the Congress on the one hand, and the breach of faith with the Muslims by the British Government on the other," and since compromise and constitutional means had failed, "the League is convinced that now the time has come for the Muslim Nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan."[1] It remains to be seen what form of direct action is envisaged; Jinnah is reported in the press to have excluded civil war, strikes, and communal riots.

E. Princely States[2]

The Muslim League's relations with the princes have been friendly and conciliatory. In contrast to Congress, which has adopted a definite stand against the perpetuation of the feudal system in the princely states, the League has taken no position which would affect the princes adversely, and it is reported that in return some of the princes support the League with financial contributions. While this policy may fail to attract progressives and peasants who would benefit by reform of the princely regimes, it does give the League several tactical advantages. The League can concentrate its fire on the Hindus, instead of diffusing it over a wider field, and it can keep the door open for future cooperation with the princes against the possibility of a unified and Congress-dominated India.

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1. See Appendix D for complete text of the resolution.
2. This section is based principally on interviews with Rasul Khan and M. H. Siddique.

The League's policy toward the princes makes difficult the work of the All-India States Muslim League, which was established in 1938 and now claims a membership of a million[1] with branches in all the important states. The States Muslim League has headquarters in Nagpur and an organizational structure closely paralleling that of the Muslim League. Its President is Rasul Khan and its Secretary M. H. Siddique. Although the professed aim of the States Muslim League is to advance the interests of the Muslim community in the princely states, it has received little encouragement or support from Jinnah and the League "high command." They have been refused admission to the Muslim League by Jinnah, and their appeals for assistance by nationally known League leaders in organizing branches in the various native states have been turned down.

Thus far, the States Muslim League has given loyal support to Jinnah. When the British Cabinet Mission visited India, the Working Committee of the States Muslim League passed a resolution in which it stated that it

> "reaffirms its implicit faith and confidence in the leadership of Qaid-i-azam, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, and wholeheartedly supports the demands placed by him before the Cabinet Mission on behalf of the Muslim nation in India and further assures him on behalf of 20 millions of Mussulmans in the Indian States that Mussulmans in the States will unflinchingly follow his lead and will be prepared for all sacrifices."

However, Rasul Khan has indicated privately that he is dissatisfied with the Muslim League's attitude toward the princes and with the treatment which the League gives him and his organization. He believes that Muslim and Hindu subjects in the native states have a common interest in seeking reform of the feudal regimes and sees much advantage in cooperating with the All-India States Peoples' Conference, affiliated with the Congress Party, in forthright opposition to the princes.

F. Communist Party

There has been much discussion in the League's inner circles recently regarding the attitude it should take toward the proferred assistance of the Communists. It appears that the Communists, having failed to infiltrate and control the Congress Party, turned for a time toward the Muslim League as the next best opportunity. In the provincial elections of 1946, the Communists supported both League and Congress candidates where the latter were not in direct opposition; otherwise the Communists supported the Muslim League candidates, explaining that there could be no concerted drive for independence from British rule until the issue of communalism had been settled by the establishment of two national states.[2]

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1. There are about 20 million Muslims in the princely states.
2. Interviews with Danyal Latifi, Lahore, who recently joined the Muslim League; Mahmooduzzaffar Khan, Lucknow; and other Communists.

The Communist Party, in pursuit of its objective of obtaining a prominent place in the League, deputed some of its members to resign from the Party and join the League. The League "high command" did not receive these new recruits with much enthusiasm but on the other hand did not reject them outright, as their talent for organizing and their tireless political activity are decided assets to the League, which is notably weak in these respects. The League's policy appeared to be to accept Communist offers of cooperation, but to keep them under close surveillance.

G. Party Propaganda

The Muslim League's activities in the field of party propaganda - the use of the press and other media of mass publicity - have been weak and are greatly outshadowed by the Congress. However, it is apparent that the inner circles of the League have recently become aware of this deficiency and are attempting to organize more effective channels of propaganda both within and outside India.

The best known voice of the Muslim League is the English-language daily, Dawn, published [until 1947] in Delhi. It is generally considered to reflect the views of the President, Jinnah. Liaquat Ali Khan is active in directing the paper. Since 1945 the editor has been Altaf Hussain, formerly correspondent for the Statesman and information officer in the Bengal provincial government. Under Hussain's editorship, Dawn became rabidly communalist; it used the exaggerated language and irresponsible arguments of the yellow press to attack Hindus and the Congress Party.

Other important English-language papers which support the Muslim League are the Star of India and the Morning News, both published in Calcutta. A news service, the Orient Press, has recently been established with the encouragement of the League.

The League in 1946 set up a Department of Publicity and Information, with Qazi Mohammed Isa in charge. Headquarters were located in Darya Gunj, Delhi, close to the Muslim League Printing Press. Thus far the department's activities have been concentrated on the production of propaganda pamphlets.

Appendix A

LAHORE RESOLUTION ON PAKISTAN, 1940

Resolution No. 1 passed at the twenty-seventh annual session of the All-India Muslim League, held at Lahore, March 22-24, 1940. This resolution is considered the official statement of the position of the Muslim League on Pakistan.

While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939, and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in these regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This Session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.

Appendix B

RESOLUTION ON PAKISTAN BY CONVENTION OF MUSLIM LEAGUE LEGISLATORS

Resolution passed at Delhi on April 9, 1946.
Muslim League leaders hold the view that this resolution does not change the official position of the League as stated in the Lahore Resolution (see above, Appendix A).

Whereas in this vast sub-continent of India a hundred million Muslims are the adherents of a Faith which regulates every department of their life (educational, social, economic and political), whose code is not confined merely to spiritual doctrines and tenets or rituals and ceremonies and which stands in sharp contrast to the exclusive nature of Hindu Dharma and Philosophy which has fostered and maintained for thousands of years a rigid Caste System resulting in the degradation of 60 million human beings to the position of untouchables, creation of unnatural barriers between man and man and superimposition of social and economic inequalities on a large body of the people of this country, and which threatens to reduce Muslims, Christians and other minorities to the status of irredeemable helots, socially and economically;

whereas, the Hindu Caste System is a direct negation of nationalism, equality, democracy and all the noble ideals that Islam stands for;

whereas, different historical backgrounds, traditions, cultures and social and economic orders of the Hindus and Muslims have made impossible the evolution of a single Indian nation inspired by common aspirations and ideals and whereas after centuries they still remain two distinct major nations;

whereas, soon after the introduction by the British of the policy of setting up political institutions in India on the lines of Western democracies based on majority rule which meant that the majority of one nation or society could impose its will on the majority of the other nation or society in spite of their opposition as was amply demonstrated during the two and a half years regime of Congress Government in the Hindu majority provinces under the Government of India Act 1935 when the Muslims were subjected to untold harassment and oppression as a result of which they were convinced of the futility and ineffectiveness of the so called safeguards provided in the Constitution and in the Instrument of Instructions to the Governors and were driven to the irresistible conclusion that in a united Indian Federation, if established, the Muslims even in majority provinces would meet with no better fate and their rights and interests could never be adequately protected against the perpetual Hindu majority at the centre;

whereas, the Muslims are convinced that with a view to save Muslim India from the domination of the Hindus and in order to afford them full scope to develop themselves according to their genius, it is necessary to constitute a sovereign independent State comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East zone and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West zone;

This Convention of the Muslim League Legislators of India, Central and Provincial, after careful consideration hereby declares that the Muslim Nation will never submit to any constitution for a United India and will never participate in any single constitution-making machinery set up for the purpose, and that any formula devised by the British Government for transferring power from the British to the peoples of India, which does not conform to the following just and equitable principles calculated to maintain internal peace and tranquillity in the country, will not contribute to the solution of the Indian problem:—

1. That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West of India, namely Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay;

2. that two separate constitution-making bodies be set up by peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective constitutions;

3. that the minorities in Pakistan and Hindustan be provided with safeguards on the lines of the All India Muslim League Resolution passed on the 23rd March 1940, at Lahore;

4. that the acceptance of the Muslim League demand of Pakistan and its implementation without delay are the sine qua non for the Muslim League co-operation and participation in the formation of an interim Government at the Centre.

This Convention further emphatically declares that any attempt to impose a constitution on a united India basis or to force any interim arrangement at the Centre contrary to the Muslim League demand will leave the Muslims no alternative but to resist such imposition by all possible means for their survival and natinnal existence.

Appendix C

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE ADOPTED BY CONVENTION OF MUSLIM LEAGUE LEGISLATORS

Adopted by Convention of Muslim League Legislators, Central and Provincial, at Delhi, April 9, 1946.

In the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful, say: my prayer and my sacrifice and my living and dying are all for Allah, the Lord of the World.

I do hereby solemnly declare my firm conviction that the safety and security, and the salvation and destiny of the Muslim nation inhabiting the sub-continent of India lie only in the achievement of Pakistan which is the one equitable, honourable and just solution of the constitutional problem and which will bring peace, freedom and prosperity to the various nationalities and communities of this great sub-continent.

I most solemnly affirm that I shall willingly and unflinchingly carry out all the directions and instructions which may be issued by the All-India Muslim League in pursuance of any movement launched by it for the attainment of the cherished national goal of Pakistan, and believing as I do in the rightness and the justice of my cause, I pledge myself to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice which may be demanded of me.

Our Lord bestow upon us endurance and keep our steps firm, and help us against the disbelieving peoples. Amen.

Appendix D

RESOLUTION ON DIRECT ACTION

Passed by the Council of the Muslim League at its session in Bombay, July 28-29, 1946.

Whereas the All-India Muslim League has today resolved to reject the proposals embodied in the statement of the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy, dated May 16, 1946, due to the intransigence of the Congress on the one hand; and the breach of faith with the Muslims by the British Government on the other, and whereas Muslim India has exhausted, without success, all efforts to find a peaceful solution of the Indian problem by compromise and constitutional means; and whereas the Congress is bent on setting up a Caste-Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the British; and whereas recent events have shown that power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs; and whereas it has become abundantly clear that Muslims in India would not rest content with anything less than the immediate establishment of an independent and full sovereign state of Pakistan, and would resist any attempt to impose any constitution, long-term or short-term, or the setting up of any Interim Government at the Centre without the approval and consent of the Muslim League, the Council of the All-India Muslim League is convinced that now the time has come for the Muslim Nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan, and get rid of the present slavery order of the British and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination, this Council calls upon the Muslim Nation to stand to a man behind their sole representative organization, the All-India Muslim League, and be ready for every sacrifice. This Council directs the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a programme of direct action to carry out the policy initiated above, and to organize the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary. As a protest against and in token of their deep resentment of the attitude of the British, this Council calls upon the Mussalmans to renounce forthwith their titles.